Taken from official records

For Enhanced Understanding: A Simplified Illustration
Access the SEC filings and their suspension/termination details through the link provided below. A journey through the SEC's reporting history reveals that the 10k report mandates the filing of 15-D reports. This filing signifies the Termination of Registration under Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, according to 17 CFR 240.12g-4(b), which is indicated through the strategic use of double negatives in the report. Such actions contravene Sections 23301, 23301.5, and 23775 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, stating that suspended or terminated REMICs, as per state Commercial Codes, are prohibited from conducting business or initiating lawsuits. The most effective course of action is to request a gold-stamped attestation of Form 15-D from the SEC's official website, SEC.GOV. This document demonstrates to the courts the entity's lack of standing in foreclosure proceedings.
To illustrate this point, consider the following example for comparison. (Observe the notarization date: May 3rd, 2013).
poasps

Herein lies a critical examination of the powers granted to Sean Grzebin, Senior Vice President of JP Morgan Chase, enabling him to represent several REMIC trusts. A fundamental query arises: How could Power of Attorney (POA) be assigned to REMIC Trusts that were already terminated or suspended by the Securities and Exchange Commission before the granting of such authority in 2013? These terminations were predominantly executed by Deutsche Bank NA Trust, often through Vice President Katherine M. Wannenmacher, listed as "Trustee," or by David H. Zielke of Long Beach Securities, in collective actions.
The legitimacy of these investments persists as a contentious issue, even as the number of investors may decrease. Should opposing counsel seek to affirm the continuity of these investments, a Majority Action Affidavit, representing over 51% of shareholder consent, becomes indispensable. Such documentation requires thorough validation, especially in the context of a CWALT REMIC. Should opposing counsel successfully present this evidence, they must then elucidate the rationale behind defining certificate holders' interests in terms of "compound interest" based on the future value of mortgage payments, rather than the property's worth. Furthermore, the obligation falls on them to clarify the reasons behind BNY MELLON's judicial directive to reconcile the interests of certificate holders under their settlement agreement.
Should the courts proceed without addressing these concerns, they risk endorsing decisions based on speculative assumptions, given the absence of any counsel capable of providing firsthand testimony regarding the status of a depleted REMIC. An IRS audit would be pivotal in affirming that the asset was never outright purchased but was instead funded through indirect advances from certificate holders, with each certificate intricately linked to the manipulated LIBOR index, affecting payout controls. This scenario underscores the critical need for scrutiny as highlighted in the
BNY MELLON Notice of Judicial Instructions

As you can see each and everyone of these trusts were seasoned for a year before being Suspended/Terminated upon the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-5 was Suspended/Terminated January 22, 2003
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-1 was Suspended/Terminated January 20, 2004
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-2 was Suspended/Terminated January 20, 2004
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-3 was Suspended/Terminated January 20, 2004
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-4 was Suspended/Terminated January 20, 2004
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1 was Suspended/Terminated January 26, 2005
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-2 was Suspended/Terminated January 26, 2005
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-3 was Suspended/Terminated January 26, 2005
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-4 was Suspended/Terminated January 26, 2005
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-5 was Suspended/Terminated January 26, 2005
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-6 was Suspended/Terminated January 26, 2005
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1 was Suspended/Terminated January 6, 2006
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-2 was Suspended/Terminated January 6, 2006
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-WL1 was Suspended/Terminated January 6, 2006
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-WL2 was Suspended/Terminated January 6, 2006
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-3 was Suspended/Terminated January 6, 2006
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-WL3 was Suspended/Terminated January 6, 2006
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WL2 was Suspended/Terminated December 29, 2006
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WL3 was Suspended/Terminated December 29, 2006
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WL1 was Suspended/Terminated December 29, 2006
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1 was Suspended/Terminated December 29, 2006
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2 was Suspended/Terminated December 29, 2006
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-3 was Suspended/Terminated December 29, 2006
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-A was Suspended/Terminated December 29, 2006
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-4 was Suspended/Terminated December 29, 2006
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-5 was Suspended/Terminated December 29, 2006
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-6 was Suspended/Terminated December 29, 2006
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-7 was Suspended/Terminated December 29, 2006
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-8 was Suspended/Terminated December 29, 2006
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-9 was Suspended/Terminated December 29, 2006
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-10 was Suspended/Terminated December 29, 2006
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-11 was Suspended/Terminated December 29, 2006

These Trusts are collectively categorized under the umbrella of "Classification REMIC I" within the Master Trust structure. They utilize a tiered system for organizing pooled loans, designated as T1, T2, and T3, which directly correspond to specific classes of certificates or component offerings. This structure includes three distinct REMICs within a Grantor Pass-through Trust, all designed as tax-exempt Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) according to their pooling and servicing agreements.
  • REMIC II encompasses the purported assets derived from REMIC I.
  • REMIC III, serving as the "Master" REMIC, manages the Regular Interests from REMIC II's assets. In this system, consumer payments made to a sub-servicer are forwarded to the Master Servicer of REMIC III. This entity then distributes dividends and interest payments to the certificate holders of the Mortgage Loan Trust, under the classification of REMIC I, acting on behalf of The Mortgage Loan Trust itself.
The foundation of the pooled loans is predicated on their anticipated future value or the Good Faith Estimate (GFE) Annual Percentage Rate (APR) value, leading to their divestiture due to their tax-exempt status. Once the collateral is divested, it effectively ceases to exist as such.
REMIC I entities were specifically structured to facilitate the acquisition of "abandoned" properties without compromising their tax-exempt status. However, due to the ongoing state of emergency declared in 1933 (HJR), the actual ownership of these properties seldom transitioned away from the Social Security Administration; instead, only the titular ownership—or NAMESAKE—was exchanged, affecting individuals directly. This scenario sets aside the complex financial maneuvers and focuses on the human impact and legal implications of such transactions.

In this instance, it's crucial to note that JPMorgan Chase is not identified as the Master Servicer for these REMICs; instead, Long Beach Mortgage Company holds that designation. Accordingly, there should be a record of this on the SEC, typically through an 8-K update report. However, there's no apparent notification of such a transfer to JPMorgan Chase. This omission is significant because, for JPMorgan Chase to legitimately claim the authority to issue this Power of Attorney (POA), there must be evidence of this transfer. Specifically, such a notification would need to have been filed before the 15-D filings to sustain JPMorgan Chase's authority as a "holder in due course.

In order to establish the standing of the REMIC, it is imperative to demonstrate that the asset in question was acquired by the REMIC prior to its termination date. This necessitates providing evidence that the IRS FORM 8594 asset acquisition was correctly filed and that the required statement under Treasury Regulation 1.856-6 was submitted to enact these foreclosures. As of present, the IRS has not furnished evidence confirming compliance with the stipulated requirements outlined in Title 24 Part 27, for which a Delegation order was issued concerning these foreclosures.
Moreover, any party seeking to foreclose must adhere to Treasury Regulation 1.856-6 et seq., particularly in the case of REMICs, which hold shares. Therefore, these foreclosing parties must furnish a copy of the majority action affidavit containing contact information for cross-examining 51% of the shareholders' signatures. Failure to provide such documentation casts doubt on the validity of the foreclosure proceedings.


Given that these REMICs operate as tax-exempt Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs), it is imperative to recognize that under 26 U.S. Code § 856, the public holds the right to access and scrutinize the REMIC's tax returns. This access extends to obtaining a comprehensive list of the intellectual properties contained within these tax-exempt entities. It is crucial to emphasize that these REMICs, as delineated in the Pooling and Service Agreements, were originally designed as tax-exempt SPVs and were not intended to hold the note or the deed.
However, their current utilization as foreclosing entities, assuming the role of holders in due course, raises significant concerns regarding the tax-exempt status of the REMICs under IRS Code US 26 section §860D. This calls into question the legitimacy of their actions. Furthermore, according to 26 U.S. Code § 4975, individuals involved in these foreclosures, including attorneys and other participants, may be deemed disqualified parties if their actions constitute the embezzlement of an estate that does not qualify as lawful recapture of a mortgage. It is pertinent to reference IRC 26 US Code Sec 1250 and 1245 recapture rules and disallowance in this context.

The enactment of IRS Code 224 carries significant repercussions, particularly for the federalized banking industry entities involved in REMIC transactions. Violations of the tax-exempt status of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) within the REMIC structure, stemming from undisclosed partnership arrangements, trigger severe penalties.
Under this provision, a 100% penalty of the REMIC's entire value is mandated, with additional punitive measures imposed. Specifically, a 15% penalty is levied atop the 100% penalty, placing the responsibility squarely on the shoulders of the implicated entities.
According to the code, individuals acting as disqualified parties, engaging in what is termed as an 'unqualified recapture' through improperly conducted foreclosures, bear direct responsibility for these penalties.
Moreover, the implications extend beyond mere financial penalties. Access to property addresses subject to foreclosure allows for scrutiny, but also permits examination of 'intellectual property master files,' providing insight into the utilization of borrowed funds. This comprehensive approach facilitates accountability and transparency in financial operations